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The issue of how best to combat the negative impacts of misinformation 
distributed via social media hangs on the following question: are there 
methods that most individuals can reasonably be expected to employ that 
would largely protect them from the negative impact that encountering 
misinformation on social media would otherwise have on their beliefs? If the 
answer is “yes,” then presumably individuals bear significant responsibility 
for those negative impacts; and, further, presumably there are feasible 
educational remedies for the problem of misinformation. However, I argue 
that the answer is “no.” Accordingly, I maintain that individuals do not bear 
significant responsibility for the negative impacts at issue; and, further, I 
maintain that the only effective remedies for the problem of misinformation 




Misinformation is ubiquitous on social media;1 and this ubiquity of misinformation on social 
media has significant negative consequences. For instance, a recent study found that in the 
lead-up to the 2020 U.S. Presidential election, media pages trafficking in misinformation 
were averaging hundreds of millions of views a month on Facebook; in fact, this study found 
that in July and August of 2020, such pages outperformed the most popular traditional news 
media pages in terms of engagement.2 And, plausibly, the sheer quantity of false claims about 
election fraud circulating on social media has had a significant impact on Americans’ false 
beliefs regarding election integrity: almost a year later, 35% of registered voters said that the 
results of the 2020 presidential election should probably or definitely be overturned.3  
 
Misinformation regarding COVID-19 provides perhaps an even more distressing example. 
Claims about miracle cures, and imagined vaccine risks, have spread incredibly widely on 
social media.4 And research has shown that being exposed to COVID-19 misinformation 
has significant impacts on what individuals believe and how they behave—for instance, by 
increasing vaccine hesitancy.5 
 
Very generally, there are two approaches to the enormously important question of how best 
to combat the negative impacts of misinformation distributed via social media. According to 
what Michel Croce and Tommaso Piazza (2021, 2) label educational approaches, we should 
focus on individual information consumers: we should design interventions—public 
information campaigns, changes to school curriculum, etc.—that will bring about relatively 
long-term changes to individuals’ behavior or cognitive traits so that they are better equipped 
to face the misinformation they are guaranteed to encounter on social media. Alternatively, 
 
1 See Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral (2018), and Bradshaw et al. (2020). 
2 Avaaz (2021). 
3 Morning Consult/Politico (2021). 
4 Avaaz (2020). 






according to what Croce and Piazza (2021, 2) label structural approaches, we should focus on 
the information environment itself: social media platforms should be modified so as to limit 
the distribution of misinformation, or to minimize the impact it has on ordinary users. 
 
These two approaches are obviously compatible—there is no particular reason we could not 
employ both educational and structural remedies. However, whether educational remedies are 
worth pursuing depends on the extent to which individual information consumers are 
responsible for the problem. For present purposes, then, the crucial question is:  
 
Are there methods that most individuals can reasonably be expected to 
employ that would largely protect them from the negative impact that 
encountering misinformation on social media would otherwise have on their 
doxastic attitudes?  
 
If the answer is “yes,” then presumably individuals bear significant responsibility for the 
negative impacts that exposure to misinformation via social media has on the accuracy of 
their doxastic attitudes (since there are reasonable steps they could have taken that would 
have avoided those impacts); and, further, it’s natural to assume that educational approaches 
will help significantly (so long as there are feasible ways to train or encourage people to take 
the requisite reasonable steps). But if the answer is “no,” then presumably individuals do not 
bear significant responsibility for the negative impacts that exposure to misinformation via 
social media has on the accuracy of their doxastic attitudes; and, further, it’s natural to reject 
educational approaches as unhelpful. If individuals are already doing everything they can 
reasonably be expected to do, attempting to make them better information consumers serves 
little purpose. 
 
I will defend a negative answer to the question at issue—that is, I will argue that it’s not the 
case that there are methods that most individuals can reasonably be expected to employ that 
would largely protect them from the negative impact that encountering misinformation on 
social media would otherwise have on their doxastic attitudes. I defend this claim by 
considering and rejecting a number of proposed methods of the relevant sort.  
 
In §2, I consider a recent proposal from Croce and Piazza (2021): social media users can 
reverse the negative impacts of encountering misinformation by consuming more traditional, 
high-quality news media. I argue that there is overwhelming evidence from psychology that 
encountering additional accurate information will not largely undo the negative impact of 
encountering inaccurate information.  
 
In §3, I consider alternative proposals that focus on changing the way that individuals 
respond to the social media content they consume. I argue that by no means would the 
proposed strategies largely protect individuals from the negative impacts of encountering 
misinformation. Ultimately, while we should grant that some educational interventions could 
help lessen the negative impact of misinformation distributed via social media, we should 
insist that any relevant improvements would be distinctly marginal—so marginal, in fact, as 
to make most any educational intervention hardly worth the expense and effort. 
 
There are a few points I should clarify before proceeding. First, as in Millar (2019), I will not 
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misinformation. By misinformation I mean false claims that can be demonstrated to be false on 
the basis of publicly available evidence. (Misinformation can also be recognized by means of 
a reference-fixing description: false claims of the sort that elicit widespread agreement 
amongst professional fact-checking organizations.) In addition, as is Millar (2019), I will not 
focus exclusively on outright belief of misinformation—my topic is the negative impact that 
encountering misinformation has on the accuracy of one’s doxastic attitudes more generally. 
Accordingly, I should note in advance that Croce and Piazza are explicitly concerned with a 
narrower topic: “sharing and believing fake news” (2021, 1). Finally, I should emphasize that 
while the present paper is exclusively concerned with social media and similar internet 
technologies, I am not assuming that misinformation distributed via social media does more 
harm than misinformation distributed via traditional media.6 
 
2. Croce and Piazza’s Proposal 
 
One might think that there is a simple method guaranteed to protect individuals from the 
negative impact of encountering misinformation on social media that anyone can employ: 
just avoid using social media altogether. Such a method would be sure to succeed: if you 
never use social media you will never encounter any of the misinformation that is ubiquitous 
on social media. However, the question at issue is whether there is some method of avoiding 
the negative impact of misinformation on social media that most individuals can reasonably 
be expected to employ; and most people can’t reasonably be expected to eliminate their 
social media use.7 First, Facebook, Twitter, and other similar internet technologies, are 
presently the cheapest and most convenient sources of information; and most people can’t 
reasonably be expected to expend the time and energy that would be required to obtain 
information from traditional media exclusively. Second, and more importantly, such 
platforms have become one of the principal means by which individuals stay connected to 
friends and loved ones; and most people can’t reasonably be expected to significantly impair 
their relationships with all other human beings in order to avoid being exposed to 
misinformation. 
 
Croce and Piazza’s (2021, 6-8) proposal avoids these difficulties by demanding much less of 
individual social media users. According to them, individuals do not need to avoid social 
media altogether in order to counteract the negative impacts of encountering 
misinformation; instead, they need only supplement their social media use by adopting a 
more “varied information diet.” Specifically, Croce and Piazza claim that individuals can 
protect themselves from the misinformation they encounter on social media by widening 
“their sources of information, at least by consuming news from traditional media such as 
newspapers and magazines (in their print or online versions), books, TV and radio 
newscasts” (2021, 6).8 Later, they add that the relevant traditional sources must also conform 
 
6 For discussion, see Benkler, Faris, and Roberts (2018). 
7 See Millar (2019, 532). 
8 Sindermann, Cooper, and Montag (2020, 46) briefly discuss a similar proposal. Coady defends a related 
conclusion: he maintains that one reason not to worry about the amount of fake news online is that “people 







to well-established journalistic norms—so, for instance, Fox News is disqualified by its 
blatant partisanship (2021, 7).  
 
But why should regularly consuming at least some high-quality news content protect 
individuals from the misinformation they encounter on social media? Croce and Piazza 
suggest two mechanisms. First, the more traditional news content you consume, the more 
likely you will be to obtain counterevidence that debunks the misinformation you have 
encountered on social media. And, second, in cases where you do not find some previously-
encountered piece of misinformation being debunked in the mainstream news media, the 
mere fact that it is not being reported by traditional news outlets provides you with evidence 
that the relevant piece of misinformation is indeed false (Croce and Piazza 2021, 6).9 
Accordingly, if Croce and Piazza are correct, then there may be promising educational 
remedies for the problem of misinformation: perhaps interventions can be designed to 
educate “social media users about the epistemic benefits of a varied information diet” and 
thereby encourage them to “manage their online epistemic conduct more responsibly” 
(2021, 8). 
 
However, there are compelling empirical reasons to reject Croce and Piazza’s proposal: the 
psychological evidence suggests that the negative impacts that encountering falsehoods has 
on the accuracy of our doxastic attitudes cannot be largely corrected by exposure to accurate 
information. First, consider cases where you encounter misinformation on social media that 
you end up believing as a result. Given the prevalence of misinformation on social media, 
you might end up believing a particular demonstrable falsehood for any number of different 
reasons. Because the information you encounter on social media is filtered by 
personalization algorithms, you will often encounter false claims that are strongly supported 
by your existing beliefs; and you are also likely to encounter the same false claims repeatedly. 
In addition, many of the demonstrable falsehoods you encounter will receive some 
persuasive social endorsement: the information might come from some trusted individual or 
organization, and it might be endorsed by very many individuals belonging to groups with 
which you identify. Suppose, then, that due to a combination of such factors, while using 
social media you come to believe that voter fraud was widespread in the 2020 Presidential 
election, or that COVID-19 vaccines are dangerous and ineffective. And suppose that, next, 
you decide to follow Croce and Piazza’s advice—you spend some time reading The New York 
Times, or watching CNN. 
 
With respect to the accuracy of your doxastic attitudes, the best-case scenario is one in 
which you happen to encounter a story that thoroughly debunks the misinformation you’ve 
come to believe. However, even in this best-case scenario, the misinformation’s negative 
impact isn’t likely to be largely reversed. First, under certain conditions, your false belief will 
simply persist in the face of the correction you’ve encountered: for instance, if you trust the 
 
9 An additional mechanism that Croce and Piazza don’t mention: the more high-quality news content you 
consume, the more true beliefs you will form about current events; and the more true beliefs you form about 
current events, the better able you will be to prevent misinformation on social media from influencing our 
doxastic attitudes by comparing purported news stories to your store of existing beliefs. For a review of the 
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source of the original false claims more than you trust the source of the correction; or, if the 
falsehood at issue is closely connected to your deeply held political or social beliefs.10  
 
Second, while the most likely outcome of encountering the correction is that your doxastic 
attitudes will become more accurate, this improvement is likely to be only partial and 
temporary. Research has shown that individuals who read a correction of some falsehood tend 
to have more accurate doxastic attitudes than they would have if they hadn’t read the 
correction—but not so accurate as they would have if they had never encountered the 
falsehood in the first place.11 Moreover, research has also shown that even this partial 
improvement tends to diminish rather quickly.12 Consequently, even in this best-case 
scenario, the false beliefs regarding voter fraud or COVID-19 vaccines that you acquired 
using social media are not likely to be largely eliminated. 
 
Relatedly, encountering and accepting a correction of previously-encountered 
misinformation does not somehow erase or expunge the relevant false information from 
memory. Instead, even when you accept a correction, the false information that you 
previously encountered but now reject continues to influence your doxastic attitudes—a 
phenomenon known as the continued influence effect.13 Recently, Gordon et al. (2019) attempted 
to determine the mechanism behind this phenomenon using neuroimaging: they found that 
when you encounter a correction of false information, rather than simply being deleted from 
the brain, the false information remains stored in memory and continues to be activated 
when you deliberate on relevant topics. Such research suggests that in cases where you 
happen to encounter a correction of a piece of misinformation, and where you find that 
correction entirely convincing, the relevant misinformation will continue to have a 
systematic negative impact on the accuracy of your doxastic attitudes. 
 
Neither can we assume that the best-case scenario will be the typical scenario. At least very 
often, when you come to believe some piece of misinformation you’ve encountered on 
social media, you won’t find the relevant claims covered by the mainstream news outlets you 
consult. According to Croce and Piazza, in such cases, you have thereby acquired compelling 
evidence that the relevant claims are false: “the fact that the mainstream media didn’t report 
a piece of alleged news that, if true, they would have published, provides indirect evidence 
that the piece is fake news” (2021, 6). However, even if we grant to Croce and Piazza that 
such lack of coverage constitutes strong evidence that the misinformation you’ve 
encountered is indeed false, we shouldn’t expect your possession of this evidence to largely 
eliminate your false belief: acquiring such evidence will have less influence than encountering 
an actual correction, and we’ve just seen that encountering a correction is not likely to largely 
reverse the impact of originally accepting the relevant misinformation.  
 
 
10 For a review of the evidence concerning the conditions under which beliefs persist in the face of corrections, 
see Jerit and Zhao (2020, 81-85). 
11 See Walter et al. (2020). 
12 See, Swire et al. (2017) and Porter and Wood (2019, 42-43). 






And, moreover, it’s not at all clear how strong the evidence in question really is. At least with 
respect to quite a lot of misinformation, you will have plausible alternative explanations for 
why you didn’t find the relevant topics covered by mainstream outlets when you consulted 
them. Perhaps the story, while interesting or entertaining, didn’t strike the journalists and 
editors of mainstream news organizations as sufficiently important to cover; or, perhaps 
some of these organizations did cover the story, but not on the days or at the times that you 
happened to read, watch, or listen; or, perhaps the original story was obtained using methods 
that journalists and editors of mainstream news organizations disapprove of; or, perhaps 
mainstream news organizations don’t want to call attention to the story thanks to their 
political biases or economic incentives.14 Accordingly, the mere fact that you haven’t come 
across any coverage of a given noteworthy story on mainstream news outlets does not 
provide you with strong reasons to conclude that that story is false. 
 
In addition, not only will the best-case scenario not be the typical scenario, the worst-case 
scenario will be extremely common: at least very often, the false beliefs that you acquired 
using social media will be reinforced when you consume high-quality traditional news content. 
In the United States, most every reputable mainstream news organization is committed to 
the principle that news coverage should be balanced—and balance is understood to mean that 
journalists must present at least two “sides” of any disputed issue, devote roughly equal time 
to each side, and avoid weighing in regarding which side is more likely to be correct.15 Even 
on seemingly non-political, scientific questions, mainstream news organizations very often 
achieve balance by contrasting the views of genuine experts with the views of political 
figures, lobbyists, or concerned citizens.16  
 
Moreover, such news organizations typically regard statements made by politicians and other 
public figures as newsworthy, regardless of whether those statements are true or false—in 
fact, outrageous falsehoods are often regarded as particularly newsworthy. Due to this 
combination of factors, when you consume news from traditional sources, you will often be 
repeatedly exposed to many of the same falsehoods that you have encountered on social 
media. For instance, in a recent study, Benkler et al. (2020) found that Donald Trump was 
able to reach enormous numbers of Americans with misinformation regarding voter fraud in 
the 2020 Presidential election largely thanks to the traditional news media’s persistent 
coverage of his tweets and other relevant public statements. Now, of course, journalists 
themselves do not endorse the relevant misinformation in such cases; but from the 
perspective of the impact that news coverage has on the accuracy of the audience’s doxastic 
attitudes, this fact is irrelevant. If you happen to be someone who trusts conservative politic 
figures more than you trust journalists and official experts, a news story that relates Trump’s 
 
14 Croce and Piazza claim that “ordinary people” do not assume that mainstream media “routinely hide the 
truth [from] the public” on the basis of such political or economic motives—only individuals trapped in a 
“pathological” informational situation would make such an assumption (2021, 7). But this claim isn’t plausible. 
In the United States, mistrust of the mainstream media is enormously widespread. For instance, a recent 
comprehensive study found that Americans trust the news media less than any other nation in the world; and 
less than half of Americans trust such mainstream outlets as ABC News, CNN, and The New York Times 
(Newman et al., 2021, 112-113). In fact, most Americans think that mainstream news outlets don’t just 
withhold information: a 2018 poll found that 92% of Republicans, 72% of independents, and 53% of 
Democrats claim that “traditional news outlets knowingly report false or misleading stories at least sometimes” 
(Fischer, 2018). 
15 See, for example, Boykoff and Boykoff (2004). 
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claim that voter fraud was widespread, and then provides balance by explaining that many 
experts maintain that the election was secure, has little chance of improving the accuracy of 
your beliefs on the topic.17  
 
Finally, thus far we’ve focused on cases in which you encounter misinformation on social 
media that you end up believing as a result; but it’s important to emphasize that the 
falsehoods you encounter have systematic negative impacts on the accuracy of your doxastic 
attitudes even when you don’t believe them. While consuming high-quality news content will 
increase your stock of true beliefs concerning current events, research has shown that each 
time you encounter some falsehood inconsistent with what you know to be true, your grip 
on the truth is weakened.18 For instance, Pennycook, Cannon, and Rand (2018) 
demonstrated that an individual who recognizes that a particular implausible fake news story 
is inaccurate will rate that story to be less inaccurate each time she encounters it. 
 
Worse still, being exposed to false information undermines the positive effect that being 
exposed to accurate information would otherwise have. So, if you have encountered large 
quantities of misinformation while using social media, even if you have managed to avoid 
believing any of it, the mere fact that you have encountered these falsehoods will negatively 
impact how you respond to the accurate news you encounter while consuming traditional 
media—the benefit you receive from consuming accurate information via traditional media 
won’t be as great as it would have been had you never consumed all that misinformation via 
social media.  
 
Even a single encounter with false information can have significant effects. For instance, van 
der Linden et al. (2017) showed that, typically, reading the statement that “97% of climate 
scientists have concluded that human-caused climate change is happening” significantly 
improved the accuracy of an individual’s estimate of the current level of scientific consensus 
regarding climate change. But when such an individual subsequently read the false statement 
that “there is no consensus on human-caused climate change,” encountering this falsehood 
completely eliminated the accuracy-improving impact that reading the true statement would 
otherwise have had. 
 
Ultimately, then, while most social media users who employ Croce and Piazza’s proposed 
method will thereby improve the accuracy of their doxastic attitudes, they will not be largely 
protected from the misinformation they encounter on social media. That is, by expanding 
your “information diet” to include more high-quality traditional news content, you will likely 
acquire more accurate doxastic attitudes than if you obtained all of your information via 
social media; but such an improvement would be marginal at best. Regardless of what the 
rest of your information diet looks like, if you consume significant amounts of social media 
content, you are likely to end up believing at least some of the significant amounts of 
misinformation you will thereby be exposed to; and the misinformation that you encounter 
on social media and avoid believing will still have a systematic negative impact on the 
 
17 For evidence concerning the role that trust of elite co-partisans plays in acceptance of misinformation, see 
Swire et al. (2017), and Calvillo et al. (2020). 






accuracy of your doxastic attitudes. So, while individuals can reasonably be expected to 
consume news content from traditional media, this method will not largely protect them 
from the negative impact that encountering misinformation on social media will have on 
their doxastic attitudes. 
 
(A significantly less important worry that’s worth mentioning: even if the proposed 
information diet protected individuals from the impact of exposure to misinformation, it’s 
not obvious that an educational intervention could be developed that would successfully 
encourage large numbers of people to increase their consumption of high-quality news 
content. Croce and Piazza characterize their proposal as a “feasible educational remedy” 
(2021, 8); but they don’t actually specify the type of intervention they have in mind. Given 
the widespread distrust of mainstream news organizations in the United States, it’s difficult 
to imagine the sort of educational campaign that would effectively train large numbers of 
Americans to distinguish high-quality from low-quality mainstream outlets—i.e., to 
recognize that The New York Times and CNN conform to well-established journalistic norms, 
but Fox News does not—and also convince them to spend significantly more time 
consuming high-quality mainstream content. On the other hand, this difficulty won’t be as 
pronounced in other countries.) 
 
3. Some Alternative Proposals 
 
If it isn’t reasonable to expect individuals to avoid social media altogether, and if merely 
supplementing your social media use with high-quality news consumption doesn’t largely 
protect you from the negative impacts of misinformation, then perhaps individuals ought to 
take certain preventative measures before using social media. For instance, perhaps 
individuals ought to cultivate the sort of cognitive traits that would enable them to remain 
largely unaffected by the misinformation they encounter on social media; or perhaps 
individuals ought to employ certain strategies or techniques while consuming social media to 
avoid being taken in by the falsehoods they come across. 
 
Some recent research on epistemic vices suggests a proposal of the former sort. Meyer, 
Alfano, and de Bruin recently found that certain epistemic vices—in particular, indifference, or 
“lack of motivation to find the truth,” and rigidity, or “insensitivity to evidence”—are 
strongly correlated with acceptance of COVID-19 misinformation (2021, 5-6). The epistemic 
vices at issue were measured using the authors’ Epistemic Vice Scale: for instance, 
indifference is measured by the extent to which subjects agree with statements such as “I am 
not very interested in understanding things,” and rigidity is measured by the extent to which 
subjects agree with statements such as “I often have strong opinions about issues I don’t 
know much about,” and “I tend to feel sure about my views even if I don’t have much 
evidence” (2021, 5). Meyer, Alfano, and de Bruin discovered that individuals who received 
the highest scores on the Epistemic Vice Scale were far more likely to believe COVID-19 
misinformation than individuals who received lower scores (2021, 14). In fact, they found 
that epistemic vice was more strongly correlated with susceptibility to COVID-19 
misinformation than were any other demographic or psychological traits, such as age, 
political affiliation, need for cognition, performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test, and so 
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Given this strong correlation, one might conclude that individuals’ doxastic attitudes are 
negatively impacted by the misinformation they consume on social media because they 
exhibit the sorts of epistemic vices at issue. And if so, this fact would suggest a method that 
social media users might reasonably be expected to employ in order to protect themselves 
from the negative impacts of misinformation: individuals should take steps to eliminate or 
mitigate the relevant epistemic vices. In other words, if individuals believe the 
misinformation they encounter on social media because they exhibit indifference and 
rigidity, then a simple method they could use to protect themselves from misinformation 
would be to become less indifferent and less rigid. So, if there are strategies one can use to 
reduce one’s epistemic vices, then the present research suggests promising educational 
remedies: perhaps individuals can be protected from misinformation by reducing or 
eliminating their epistemic vices with the right kind of training.19 
 
However, there are at least three significant difficulties with this proposal. First and 
foremost, Meyer, Alfano, and de Bruin’s research only establishes a correlation between 
epistemic vice and accepting particularly implausible misinformation. Their study utilized 
falsehoods concerning COVID-19 such as “adding pepper to your meals prevents COVID-
19,” “5G mobile networks spread COVID-19,” and “exposing yourself to the sun or to 
temperatures higher than 77°F prevents the coronavirus disease” (2021, 9). These claims 
were taken from a World Health Organization “myth-busting” webpage, so presumably they 
had spread widely online; but by no means are these claims representative of the kind of 
misinformation that reaches the most people on social media and has the biggest impact on 
what people believe.  
 
For instance, the present research provides no reason to think that becoming less indifferent 
and rigid would prevent someone from believing that the COVID-19 vaccines are dangerous 
and ineffective, or that voter fraud was rampant in the 2020 Presidential election. 
Consequently, even if there were some method that individuals could reasonably be expected 
to employ that would eliminate their epistemic vices, doing so would not largely protect 
them from much of the most consequential misinformation that they are likely to encounter 
while using social media. 
 
A second difficulty is that Meyer, Alfano, and de Bruin’s research focuses exclusively on 
belief in misinformation. But, as we’ve already seen (§2), the falsehoods you are exposed to 
have a systematic negative impact on the accuracy of your doxastic attitudes even when you 
don’t believe them. So, even if you happen to be extremely low with respect to indifference 
and rigidity, and even if you recognize that a particular piece of misinformation is indeed 
false, your grip on the truth will still be undermined each time you are exposed to it. And, 
moreover, your lack of epistemic vices will not prevent the misinformation you encounter 
on social media from counteracting the benefits that exposure to accurate information would 
otherwise have. 
 
19 Meyer, Alfano, and de Bruin endorse only a more qualified conclusion along these lines: they suggest that if 
epistemic vice plays a role in the acceptance of misinformation, and “if epistemic vice can be countered using 
educational or other interventions, then the public health response to COVID-19 may be bolstered by this line 







A third difficulty is that it’s not clear whether there are any effective methods via which 
individuals could eliminate the relevant epistemic vices. Individuals with the vices at issue are 
the kind of people who freely admit “I often have strong opinions about issues I don’t know 
much about,” and “I tend to feel sure about my views even if I don’t have much evidence.” 
What kind of training, or therapy, could convince such a person that, in fact, one should 
only believe what one’s evidence supports? Presumably individuals could be prevented from 
becoming indifferent and rigid with the right sort of guidance; but it’s not obvious that 
someone who already possesses these vices will be able (and motivated) to change such 
perverse views of permissible epistemic conduct. And so, if these vices can’t be eliminated, 
then—even if we were to grant that eliminating the relevant epistemic vices would protect 
individuals from most misinformation—individuals don’t have a method they can reasonably 
be expected to employ that would largely protect them from the negative impact of 
misinformation. 
 
Alternatively, one might think that, in order to protect themselves from misinformation, 
individuals needn’t dramatically overhaul their firmly-established character traits—perhaps 
they simply need to exercise more care or vigilance when consuming information via social 
media. Recent research by Gordon Pennycook and colleagues suggests a proposal of this 
sort. For instance, Pennycook and Rand (2019) found that individuals who are more prone 
to engage in the right sort of reflection—as measured by performance on the Cognitive 
Reflection Test—are better able to distinguish accurate news stories from stereotypical fake 
news stories. And Bago, Rand, and Pennycook (2020) found that when individuals take the 
time to engage in deliberation, they are better able to identify fake news headlines as 
inaccurate. Summarizing a significant quantity of related research, Pennycook and Rand 
maintain that one of the principal reasons that individuals fail to recognize that fake news 
stories are false is that “they do not stop to reflect sufficiently on their prior knowledge (or 
have insufficient or inaccurate prior knowledge)” (2021, 393). 
 
Such research, then, suggests a method that social media users might reasonably be expected 
to employ in order to protect themselves from the negative impacts of misinformation: 
when consuming information via social media, individuals should engage in sufficient 
reflection and deliberation—they should be careful to bring their stored knowledge to bear 
as a kind of misinformation filter. If such a method were able to protect individuals from 
misinformation, then promising educational remedies might exist: for instance, Pennycook 
and Rand suggest that educational “interventions that are directed at making the public more 
thoughtful consumers of news media may have promise” (2019, 48). More generally, one 
might think that critical thinking training might successfully encourage large numbers of 
people to engage in the requisite sort of reflection while using social media.20 
 
However, there are at least three significant difficulties with this proposal. The first is that, 
once again, the research at issue is focused exclusively on belief in misinformation. Even if 
we grant that there are methods by which individuals can increase their tendency to engage 
in the relevant sort of reflection while using social media, the best outcome we could expect 
is that they would end up believing fewer false stories than they would have otherwise. But, 
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again, the falsehoods we encounter have systematic negative impacts on the accuracy of our 
doxastic attitudes even when we avoid believing them. 
A second difficulty is that it’s not clear whether there are any effective methods via which 
individuals can increase their tendency to engage in the relevant sort of reflection. It seems 
plausible that educational interventions could be designed that train individuals to take the 
time to reflect and deliberate while consuming information. But whether any such 
intervention will ultimately be effective is an open empirical question—at present there 
simply isn’t good evidence that educational interventions improve critical thinking abilities 
over the long term.21 (As Pennycook and Rand (2021, 397) explain, there is considerable 
evidence that exposing individuals to “accuracy prompts”—nudges that remind social media 
users to focus their attention on accuracy—significantly improves the rate at which they 
identify fake news stories. But such an intervention is a structural rather than an educational 
remedy—the purpose is to make the information environment safer to navigate, not to bring 
about relatively long-term changes to individuals’ behavior or cognitive traits.) 
 
Finally, the most fundamental difficulty with the present proposal is that reflection and 
deliberation can only hope to protect you from a small fraction of the misinformation you 
are likely to encounter on social media. Taking the time to reflect on your existing 
knowledge while consuming social media will only protect you from misinformation so long 
as the relevant false claims are inconsistent with what you already know. But, first, in many 
cases, you simply won’t possess any relevant beliefs. Some of the most consequential 
misinformation that circulates widely on social media concerns issues that most people don’t 
know much about; for instance, most people don’t know much about the science of 
COVID-19 vaccines, or the details of election security, and so they can’t filter out many false 
claims concerning these topics. And, second, in many cases, the misinformation you 
encounter will be consistent with your existing beliefs (sometimes because your relevant 
existing beliefs will be false). For instance, research has shown that individuals are much 
more likely to judge that a stereotypical fake news story is accurate when it conforms to their 
political commitments: such falsehoods seem more plausible to someone with the relevant 
background beliefs.22  
 
This point is particularly important in the present context: thanks to personalization 
algorithms, when you use social media, you will regularly encounter misinformation that is 
consistent with your existing beliefs. Accordingly, the proposed method—stopping to reflect 
and deliberate while consuming social media—can only prevent individuals from believing 
misinformation that happens to be incompatible with true beliefs they already possess; and 
so, this method offers individuals no protection against a significant proportion of the 




The question we started with was: are there methods that most individuals can reasonably be 
expected to employ that would largely protect them from the negative impact that 
 
21 See El Soufi and See (2019). 






encountering misinformation on social media would otherwise have on their doxastic 
attitudes? We’ve now seen that there are compelling reasons to conclude that the answer is 
“no.” There are methods available to social media users that would likely yield 
improvements: if you consume more high-quality traditional news content, suppress certain 
epistemic vices, or take the time to reflect and deliberate while consuming social media 
content, you will likely end up with fewer false beliefs than you would have otherwise. But 
such improvements would be marginal at best. Whatever else you do, so long as you 
regularly utilize social media, you will be repeatedly exposed to misinformation that is 
strongly consistent with what you already believe, and that is endorsed by individuals and 
groups you admire and trust. And, as such, you are likely to end up believing at least some 
portion of this misinformation; and the misinformation that you avoid believing will still 
have a systematic negative impact on the accuracy of your doxastic attitudes. No ordinary 
human being can inhabit such an information environment without suffering significant 
harm. 
 
Accordingly, any educational intervention designed to encourage large numbers of people to 
employ one of the aforementioned methods would likely have only a minor impact—and so 
would not be worth the expense and effort. So, while educational approaches are compatible 
with structural approaches, and are likely to do some good, we have independent reasons for 
concluding that they are not worth pursuing. Instead, in order to effectively combat the 
negative impacts of misinformation distributed via social media, rather than focus on 
individuals, we ought to focus on the information environment itself. In particular, we ought 
to focus on whether we can identify (morally and politically acceptable) modifications to 
social media platforms that would significantly limit the distribution of misinformation, or 
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